Russia-Ukraine situation The EU’s aid is limited and self-interest is greater than Ukraine’s

The spring rain of 2023 brings life to everything, but it is also the first sign of a new war in Ukraine. Since the war resumed in 2022, Russian casualties have ranged from 189,500 to 223,000, while Ukrainian casualties have reached up to 130,000.

The number of casualties in Ukraine is relatively low, but the country has a population of 41 million, is a major battlefield, and its economic growth rate is expected to be minus 29.1 percent in 2022. Even with the aid of Western countries, the overall national power of Ukraine has to be considered. The May offensive is expected to test not only the success of the battlefield, but also the future of the post-war international order.

In 2022, Western aid did succeed in helping Ukraine in the first place, preventing Russia from achieving its goal of quickly capturing Kiev. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the amount of global aid to Ukraine last year was more than 109.4 billion dollars, and the amount of U.S. military aid reached 77.5 billion dollars. According to the data of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, last year’s defense expenditure was 41.8 billion dollars, and Western aid was almost twice the size of Ukraine’s defense budget.

Although Europe’s help to Ukraine is not a drop in the bucket, it is more self-serving than helpful. According to The Kiel Institute for The World Economy-IFW, a German think tank, Germany has pledged €6.15bn in bilateral aid to Ukraine since January 2022, But the government is spending €34.5 billion on helping Uniper energy, similar to €5.65 billion in transport cost subsidies in the summer of 2022. Other EU countries are not far behind. Almost all spend ten times as much on energy subsidies at home, which are still more important to the fight for regime security.

On the other hand, Russia’s defense budget in 2022 is as high as 75 billion dollars, the overall figure only reaches half of the total amount of the West and Ukraine, but it can interact with Ukraine on the battlefield. If the battlefield is to turn around, it still needs the West to keep warm. If the West does not see significant military achievements this year, it is likely that a major variable will be whether non-Eastern European countries far away from the battlefield will adjust their level of aid to Ukraine in the name of “strategic autonomy” or reduce their enthusiasm for aid to Ukraine.

For China, a small setback in Ukraine is the most desirable outcome, allowing Russia to reduce its power and its future posture toward China to promote the “global development initiative” as a partner of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, regardless of whether the truce conforms to the principle of sovereign states. To achieve a power structure favorable to China, avoid sending lethal aid to Russia, or technically reduce the frequency and cycle of transactions.